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Abstract 
This article conceptualizes populism as a discourse of international relations that arises as 
response to state transformation, a phenomenon that encompasses changes in both state-society 
relations and the norms defining the appropriate practice of statehood. The current surge of 
populism is a response to one such transformation: the internationalization of state elites and 
their insulation from popular scrutiny. Populism does not simply address material and cultural 
dislocations that internationalization entails. Crucially, its distinct discursive logic allows these 
partial social demands to adopt the moral claim to representation of the ‘real people’ and so 
counter the universality of the norms that underpin state transformation. Beyond the current 
conjuncture of state internationalization, this conceptualization accommodates iterations of 
populism in various regional and historical contexts of state transformation, making it a 
promising basis for the further comparative study of populism. 
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Introduction 
Scholars have long considered populism a pervasive condition of democracy (Canovan, 
1999; Mudde, 2004), but its current surge across the world has generated a discussion about 
how populism relates to broader trends of international politics as well. In this vein, and most 
prominently, the current rise of populism has been linked with globalization. To some scholars, 
globalization explains populism as a cultural resistance (Kriesi et al, 2008) or as a reaction to 
socioeconomic dislocations (Rodrik, 2017).  
Valuable as these analyses are, they still leave questions open. Systemic explanations of 
populism as reaction to globalization can ignore important variations and contingencies such 
as the timing of its emergence. These explanations can also suffer from conceptual slippage, 
given that the exact link between globalization and populism is usually specified according to 
one’s definition of globalization and whether its economic or cultural dimensions are 
prioritized. Even so, it is also not clear why globalization should give rise specifically to 
populism or populism-infused phenomena, and not socialism or nationalism in their pure 
forms. What makes populism such a pervasive feature of international relations today? And 
more generally, why and how does change on the international level foster populism in national 
politics? 
All this points to an overarching conceptual question that is the main focus of this article, 
namely how to think about populism as a phenomenon and concept of international relations. 
I argue that this is most fruitfully done if we understand populism not as programmatic response 
to economic or cultural dislocation brought about by international change (because this can be 
done by other pre-existing ideologies as well), but as a distinct way of articulating societal 
frustrations as an overarching demand of an antagonistic identity of the ‘people’ for recognition 
and representation. Looked at this way, the question of the link between populism and systemic 
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conditions like globalization is less about policy content and more about how international 
change engenders tensions in the relationship between official power and political community. 
To understand this connection between international change and the power-people nexus, 
I turn to the concept of state transformation. Populism today is a response to one such major 
transformation of statehood: the emergence after the Cold War of the internationalized state 
whereby, in response to their ever-shrinking capacity to regulate modernizing and fragmenting 
domestic societies, state elites presented the increasingly transnational nature of policy 
challenges under globalization as legitimation for their migration to transgovernmental policy 
networks and supranational institutions. This has changed the reference point of state 
legitimacy from state elites’ vertical relationship with the political community to their 
horizontal cosmopolitan relationship with equivalent elites from other states. In the process, 
‘states have uncoupled from societies’ (Bickerton et al, 2015: 312), and governing has become 
detached and insulated from national representative processes.  
Any state transformation normally entails some combination of redistribution of economic 
costs, a challenge to established patterns of power-society relations, and normative 
modernization that often fosters cultural alienation. With its embrace of international economic 
openness, the insulation of its elites in opaque transnational governance networks, and the 
prioritization of universal ideas of efficiency and rules-based governance, state 
internationalization translates globalization domestically as a multifaceted challenge to the 
standing of political communities as source of political legitimacy. In reaction to this, populism 
demands a return to re-territorialized political rule where the sovereignty of government and 
people become coterminous again. Populism’s potency as a political discourse, and its 
distinctiveness as a concept, is that it addresses all three externalities of internationalization: 
economic-material, political-representational, and normative.  
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The article argues that populism is a distinct political discourse of international relations 
that constitutes a self-standing, and qualitatively different from ideologies like nationalism or 
socialism, reaction to state internationalization. Especially concerning nationalism, the analysis 
will show that populism differs from its classical vision of the overlap between political power, 
state and nation. For populism, the territorially bounded re-alignment between political power 
and people can only be realized against a state apparatus absorbed in transnational networks 
and reflecting the priorities of internationalization. At the same time, under internationalization 
populism’s opposition to official power often comes to be articulated in conjunction with the 
theme of separation of the domestic from the international, typically a feature of nationalism.  
The article proceeds as follows: First, I discuss the concept of state transformation and the 
phenomenon of state internationalization. Then I present my conceptualization of populism, 
showing how populism as a discourse of international relations challenges state transformation 
generally, and the internationalized state particularly. In the third section I offer an empirical 
demonstration of the argument, outlining the vision of the neo-sovereign state put forth by 
populists. The cases I examine are Western democracies, which have the longest experience of 
embeddedness in global and regional transgovernmental governance. My conceptualization 
however can apply to state internationalization in other regions, as well as historical cases of 
state transformation. The concluding section considers the implications of the argument for the 
study of populism in world politics. 
 
State Transformation and the Emergence of the Internationalized State 
Populism is a reaction to the internationalization of the state as the latest incidence of state 
transformation, a multi-faceted phenomenon with internal and external, and material and 
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normative, aspects. The state is understood here as a purposeful actor (Mann, 1984; Skocpol, 
1979) operating on the intersection of the domestic and the international. Domestically it is 
linked with its society via a specific set of institutions and representative practices (Migdal, 
2001; Risse-Kappen, 1994). Internationally it is embedded in institutional arrangements, rules, 
norms and practices that define the character and generally accepted standards of statehood.  
The specific shape of statehood is a function of how state elites mediate, aggregate and 
adapt to these domestic and international conditions (Huber et al, 2015). In doing so, elites 
pursue primarily the state’s (and their own) reproduction as a legitimate institution of political 
rule. Internationally this has a material aspect (e.g. maintaining effective control over a certain 
territory), but also a normative one: the state must constantly adapt to evolving norms of 
appropriate exercise of sovereignty (Zürn and Deitelhoff, 2015: 207; generally, Wendt, 1999). 
Domestically elites must both abide by established standards of legitimate representation and 
satisfy a variety of societal demands. These international and domestic exigencies on the state 
are often contradictory, which often constrains but also provides opportunities to state elites to 
pursue their reproduction by playing domestic pressures off international ones. 
The international environment can pose both material and ideational pressures for change 
on the state. Materially, changes in the international distribution of political and economic 
power can restructure power relations between societal interests in national arenas (Gourevitch, 
1986). Ideationally, change of the normative character of statehood also redefines the 
appropriate modes of incorporation and representation of society (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 
1995: 135-137). The state is also subject to transformation from below such as the emergence 
of new political cleavages, the loosening of traditional social bonds etc.  
State transformation is thus a meaningful change of material and ideational aspects of 
statehood, both with regards to state-society relations domestically and the practice of 
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statehood internationally. State transformation is catalysed by a constellation of internal and 
external changes engulfing the state. The specific direction and content of this transformation 
however is determined by the actions of state elites themselves as they engage with changing 
conditions and pursue the perpetuation of the state’s and their own legitimacy. The passage 
from the classical nation-state to the internationalized state today is an example of such a 
transformation that reflects a conscious strategy of adaptation and balancing between domestic 
and external change. 
In the classical nation-state, which in post-World War II Western Europe and North 
America was also a mass-democratic one, the sovereignties of political authority, state 
apparatus and political community over a given territory coincided (Bickerton, 2015: 58; Zürn 
and Deitelhoff, 2015: 195-196). In the advanced capitalist states of ‘embedded liberalism’, the 
dilemma of international and domestic adaptation was easier to resolve, since in principle 
governments could satisfy societal preferences while they partook in international cooperation. 
For example, trade openness and stable exchange rates still allowed governments to pursue 
their preferred model of economic regulation and welfare (Katzenstein, 1985; Ruggie, 1982). 
After the end of the Cold War, the national economies of the sovereign nation-state were 
becoming difficult to regulate due to high capital mobility and intensification of transnational 
economic and societal flows and exchanges. At the same time state-society relations underwent 
a significant transformation (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Under embedded liberalism they were 
structured by mass parties and sectional organizations representing and aggregating societal 
interests. But the representation of these interests had been steadily weakening since the 1970s 
in Western societies due to ongoing socioeconomic and value changes and the loosening of 
traditional identifications like religion and social class (Inglehart, 1977; Katz and Mair, 1995).  
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This ‘crisis of Keynesianism’ made state elites realize that policymaking according to the 
preferences of increasingly differentiated and atomized societies failed to produce efficient 
outcomes (Bickerton, 2015: 65-68, 71), not least because at the same time economic and social 
policy challenges became more transnational in character. In response to this, elites gradually 
strengthened political and administrative transgovernmental policy networks, and international 
and supranational institutions. Within these institutions and networks, politicians and 
bureaucrats from different states exercise collective control over the economic, societal and 
security aspects of globalization. The migration of state elites to a supranational and 
transgovernmental realm of mutually monitored policy convergence was seen as offering the 
best way to manage processes that increasingly cut across borders (Huber et al, 2015: 17).  
But in this way the international legitimized the elites’ emancipation from society 
(Bickerton, 2015: 66), as internationalization of policymaking allowed them to evade the 
vertical chain of accountability between government and people when this relationship was 
being significantly complicated by the contradictions of economic and social modernization 
(Bickerton, 2012; Mair, 2009: 14). The disaggregation of state sovereignty and the transference 
of its political and administrative components to supranational institutions and 
transgovernmental networks sheltered elites from the demands of individualizing societies, and 
allowed them to focus on responding to global competitive pressures instead. Important 
changes in the nature of state-society relations in Western democracies, such as the passage 
from the mass to the cartel party, have been legitimated with reference to the needs of the state 
in a globalized world (Blyth and Katz, 2005).  
Elites now present their legitimacy as deriving less from representation of society than from 
the delivery of efficient responses to problems of transnational magnitude (Bickerton, 2015: 
57). Thus, state internationalization is the outcome of conscious elite strategies in the face of 
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concurrent domestic and international challenges to their capacity to act. The denationalization 
of policymaking removed elites from the scrutiny of political communities (Bickerton et al, 
2015: 320), while it allowed them to renew the legitimacy of the state as an entity pursuing 
efficient solutions through transgovernmental cooperation. The side-effect of this strategy is 
the entrenchment of international institutions that, by facilitating policy coordination and 
mutual monitoring between national authorities, limit the discretion of political communities 
for meaningful decision-making at home (Zürn, 2004: 262-275). 
While this process has been most intense, and most carefully documented, in the West 
(Bickerton, 2012), it is not confined there. Indeed, the crisis of Keynesian political economy 
and social modernization in the West have their analogies in the failure e.g. of import 
substitution and protectionism in Latin American economies in the 1980s, or the popular 
democratic pressures on authoritarian states like Turkey and Thailand in recent decades. Even 
though the pathways of change differ from the West, in many non-Western countries the 
dynamic has been similar: economic globalization and proliferation of international network 
governance after the end of the Cold War provided state elites with the means and legitimation 
to shelter themselves from demands of increasingly restive societies at home (Hadiz and 
Chryssogelos, 2017).  
State internationalization creates three sets of interrelated dislocations in national arenas. 
First, the economic dimensions of globalization, such as openness to free trade and global 
capital flows, create substantial costs to socioeconomic strata exposed to international 
competition. These material dislocations can find expression in sociocultural grievances, as the 
scholarship on the affinity of ‘globalization losers’ for the populist radical right in Europe 
demonstrates (Kriesi et al, 2008; Rydgren, 2013).  
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Second, internationalization of the state poses important questions about the democratic 
legitimacy of political systems that still function overwhelmingly along national lines. In 
response to this, the transference of policymaking away from the national level can itself 
become politicized, as the legitimacy of increasingly intrusive international institutions and of 
decision-making far and above nationally demarcated democratic communities becomes an 
object of contestation (Bickerton, 2015: 59; Zürn, 2004: 275-277). 
Third, state transformation becomes possible because it can be legitimated with reference 
to dominant international norms. The passage from ‘modern to post-modern statehood’ is 
justified by state elites as overcoming old-fashioned sovereignty and embracing economic and 
cultural openness (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 22-23). The shift away from vertical territorial 
representation is legitimated by the favouring of decentralized modes of governance over 
hierarchical government; the downplaying of territoriality (Bickerton, 2015: 54-55, Zürn and 
Deitelhoff, 2015: 211); and the view of sovereignty as conditional on the satisfaction of 
universalist norms like the responsibility to protect (Zürn and Deitelhoff, 2015: 208). 
Economically, competitiveness and efficiency trump representation of societal interests that 
are often presented as sectional and parochial (Zürn, 2012: 66).  
For internationalized elites operating above and beyond the nation-state, ‘“policy” 
efficiency and “best practices” [are more important] than representation’ (Kratochwil, 2014: 
119). This normative change however is not unproblematic. Its ‘cult of universality of norms’ 
sidesteps the ‘historicity and embeddedness of institutions in […] specific “local” practices and 
understandings’ (ibid: 129). For all its claims to universality, the modernization of international 
norms under globalization can also alienate and energize an array of particularisms along class, 
ethnic, cultural etc. lines. As I will show, one of the strengths of populism is that it can reinstate 
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to these particularisms their own claim to universality: the moral appeal of the ‘people’ for 
recognition and representation.   
 
 Conceptualizing Populism as Discourse of International Relations 
Populism is a contested concept. Here I view it as a discourse following the work of Ernesto 
Laclau (2005a; 2005b; see also Howarth et al 2000; Panizza, 2005; Stavrakakis, 2014). 
According to this approach, populism is an antagonistic discourse that coalesces a chain of 
demands unaddressed by official power. This chain is articulated via a signifier – usually the 
‘people’ – whose generality (or ‘emptiness’) captures the multiplicity of unaddressed demands 
and articulates them as a unified front against the official power that has neglected them. A 
populist discourse follows the logic of equivalence: unaddressed demands become linked in a 
chain that acts as a dividing line between people and power. Populism's logic of equivalence 
contrasts to the logic of difference: official power segmenting the chain of social demands and 
treating each in separation.  
The discursive view is important for conceptualizing populism in international relations. 
As opposed to the dominant approach in the comparative study of populism, which views it as 
a thin-centred ideology that acquires a more specific content by association with thicker 
ideologies (see most recently Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), the discursive approach 
views populism as a self-standing phenomenon with its own distinct logic of political 
contestation. The discursive view also allows the concept of populism to travel more for 
comparative research, given that well-developed, thick ideologies are rarer outside Western 
countries. As such, it provides a more flexible analytical framework for studying populism in 
its international dimensions. 
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Populist discourses emerge as a response to representational gaps between power and 
society. These gaps are both material-structural – in the sense that a political system always 
fails to tackle some societal demands – and discursive – in the sense that there is never a perfect 
overlap between the legitimating discourse of political power and all values represented in a 
political community (Arditi, 2010: 493). The nature of representational gaps in a political 
system conditions the subsequent expression of populism.  As the official power towards which 
social demands are addressed is the state, itself part of a broader international system with 
structural and normative dimensions (Bull, 1977), the relationship between power and society 
is internationally embedded.  
The domestic and international pressures the state found itself in after the end of the Cold 
War, and the ways its elites have decided to tackle them, showcase how the gaps between state 
and society can be internationally conditioned. The function of the internationalized state is 
underpinned by the segmented treatment of social demands under technocratic and inclusive 
discourses (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017: 6). Elites’ decision to transpose policymaking 
from the national to the supranational and transgovernmental level raises the question of 
democratic legitimacy of world politics: the more comprehensive international institutions and 
transgovernmental governance processes become, the more they constrain the meaningfulness 
of democratic choice at the national level (Zürn, 2004; 2014).   
The calculations of state elites have been particularly obvious in Europe, where under the 
weight of EU integration the nation-state has been transformed into the ‘member state’. In the 
European member state national governments consciously neutralize social demands and 
legitimize their rule with reference to their participation in opaque EU policymaking processes. 
Rather than the vertical relationship with their electorates, state elites prioritize the horizontal 
relationship with elites from other EU member states, as they collectively eschew national 
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representative politics. In this sense populism is a reaction to the hollowing out of national 
democracy under intense regional integration (Bickerton, 2015: 61; Mair, 2009: 17).  
But structural and normative gaps between society and state do not over-determine the 
emergence and content of populism. These hinge on how political actors will align available 
discursive elements in the social field to construct antagonistic discourses and an identity of 
the ‘people’ (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017: 5). Thus, the negotiation by state elites of the 
relationship and contradictions between the domestic and the international contains within it 
the opportunities for populist agency to exploit new gaps between state and society. As 
populism becomes articulated at two intersections – of state and society, and of the domestic 
and the international – populist mobilization often develops with external referents. Especially 
in the internationalized state, the ‘power’ and the ‘system’ increasingly connote not only 
domestic but also international authority and elites. 
The discursive approach allows for the comparative research of populism in an 
international context: as state internationalization creates multifaceted material, political and 
normative dislocations in multiple countries or regions, frustrated demands get woven together 
and articulated around the representational claim of the ‘people’. The specific construction and 
articulation of the ‘people’ will reflect variations of the local context – countries’ political 
systems, ethnic composition, political economies, historical memories, position of 
peripherality etc. – and different programmatic agendas will develop. Thus, populist agendas 
under globalization should be compared less in terms of policy content than of the form with 
which demands are put forward.  
This view of populism as political agency within a broader structure of state-society 
relations and the state’s embeddedness in the international system helps account for the 
different time sequence of the appearance of populism. The internationalization of the state is 
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a process that has been ongoing since the 1980s, but effective populist reactions have taken a 
long time to appear. Often this happens only under conditions of concurrent economic and 
political crisis (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017: 407), such as financial crises in Latin America 
in the 1980s, Asia in the 1990s and Europe in the 2010s that quickly acquired the character of 
severe crises of representation of national political systems.  
In this way, the argument here avoids international-structural determinism by accounting 
for the variegated impact international systemic conditions may have on national politics. 
Populism is a temporally and spatially contingent effect of the process by which globalization 
becomes translated in domestic contexts as a multifaceted challenge to power-society relations 
by the adaptation efforts of political and administrative elites – efforts that, under globalization, 
invariably take the form of internationalization of policymaking but can cause a variety of 
concurrent material, political and cultural frustrations and therefore different types of populism 
in different countries at different points in time.  
In a context of state internationalization, it is common to identify populism with the demand 
for national sovereignty.  But ‘national resistance […] is not based in the respective nation-
states’ “obsession” with sovereignty, but within the national societies’ (Zürn, 2004: 279, 
emphasis in original). Populism is a discourse of social sovereignty that simultaneously 
challenges supranational institutions and transgovernmental policy networks outside and 
national elites inside the state eager to participate in them. Thus, a key difference between 
populism and nationalism is that while nationalism assumes the identification of state and 
people, populism sees the interests of the two under internationalization as diverging. 
Consequently, when populist parties gain power they often make a distinction between the 
political component of the state (now considered to be aligned again with the interests of the 
people) and its bureaucratic, judicial, regulatory etc. components embedded in 
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transgovernmental networks (Zürn et al, 2012). For nationalists the state is the expression 
internationally of the nation. For populists, political rule must express the interests of the people 
against a state absorbed in a web of transnational policy cooperation. In populism re-
territorialized political rule actually means rule against the state (at least until the later has been 
purged of its internationalized elites).  
Populism does not just articulate material and representational grievances as rightful 
demands of the ‘people’. Its very logic as antagonistic and oppositional discourse also 
contradicts the universalist character of established international norms, through which state 
elites have tried to legitimize domestically state transformation. By expressing a distinct way 
of relating to established norms of the international system, we can think of populism not 
simply as a phenomenon but as a distinct discourse of international relations. 
State transformation generally, and the emergence of the internationalized state more 
specifically, is a phenomenon with normative as well as material dimensions. Generally official 
power prioritizes a technocratic and segmented way of addressing social demands. In the 
internationalized state this has taken the form of ‘responsible’ politics that privileges efficient 
collective problem-solving over satisfying the demands of specific social groups (Bickerton, 
2012; Mair, 2009). The elites of the internationalized state present their capacity to tackle 
policy challenges as intricately tied to their membership of transgovernmental and 
supranational networks and institutions. This is however more than a question of practicality. 
Institutions and networks of global governance are underpinned by myriad norms, practices 
and ideas with a claim to universal applicability (Reus-Smit, 2001; Sikkink, 1998): efficiency, 
openness, rule-based decision-making, rights etc. In the face of the universality of established 
international norms, the partial demands and grievances of social groups and political 
communities can be easily dismissed as parochial (Kratochwil, 2014: 203).  
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Weaving frustrated demands around the signifier of the ‘people’ reflects populism’s 
intention to allow the bearers of these demands to redefine themselves as the real political 
community with a rightful claim to representation. At the core of populism is the claim of a 
political identity composed of the excluded parts to define themselves as the 
legitimate whole of the political community (Arditi, 2010: 490-493; Laclau, 2005a: 81). 
Populism is characterized then by a discursive bifurcation. By rallying multiple marginalized 
groups, populism aims to impose a new hegemonic definition of the political field (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001). But before achieving this universalism, the political identities of the ‘people’ 
necessarily start off as antagonistic, oppositional and therefore essentially partial and 
circumscribed. Populism’s aim to achieve a hegemonic universalism-in-partiality is the mirror 
image of official power’s promotion of ‘diversity-in-unity’ (Abts and Rummens, 2007). 
Populism’s bifurcation between particularism and universalism enables it to counter the 
universality of international norms upon which state elites rely to legitimize the 
internationalization of the state. While cultural identitarian grievances can be dismissed as 
narrow nationalism and socioeconomic demands as parochial classism, populism puts forth a 
morally underpinned dialectic between the partiality of the political identity of the ‘people’ it 
has constructed and the universality of the claim to representation. Class, ethnic, national etc. 
grievances against the internationalized state can make their own strong claim to universality 
as demands of the ‘people’, the real political community. What look like parochial agendas in 
a globalized world acquire their own counter-claim to universality against the norms that 
underpin the international institutions within which state elites have retreated. In this way, 
populism effectively undercuts the effort of state elites to reproduce and legitimize themselves 
via the international realm. 
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The Neo-Sovereign State in Practice: ‘Taking Back Control’ in Western Democracies 
Populist parties and movements in Western democracies, which have the longest 
experience of embeddedness in networks of transgovernmental governance, come in different 
ideological iterations, spanning the right and the left of the political spectrum. Despite the 
different ways in which they construct the identity of the ‘people’, they challenge the principles 
and legitimations that have underpinned the denationalization of policymaking in the West. To 
norms of economic openness, policy effectiveness and post-modernization of sovereignty, 
these populists juxtapose the moral claim to political representation of territorially rooted 
political communities. 
Donald Trump’s 2016 US presidential election campaign was not only characterized by a 
virulent anti-immigrant discourse, but also by the explicit promise to free the US from the 
burdens of serving as the guarantor of the international liberal order. Trump's discourse 
explicitly tied domestic elites to foreign interests that rob the US government of its capacity to 
protect American interests and condemn its people to ‘unfair deals’ – be it trade openness or 
the security commitments to allies in Europe and Asia. As articulated in his inauguration 
speech, Trump's promise to restore popular sovereignty had a clear external referent – the motto 
of ‘America first’, a promise to shed America’s role of global imperial guarantor in favour of 
the role of a nation-state looking out for its interests. 
In Europe populists have long been Eurosceptic, opposing the transference of power from 
the state to the EU, a thick organizational web of supranational and transgovernmental 
cooperation. When the vast majority of successful populist parties in Europe belonged to the 
radical right this could be explained by their strongly nationalist or, more accurately, nativist 
feelings (Mudde, 2007). Yet the Eurozone crisis revealed how this role could be played as well 
by populist parties of the left like SYRIZA and Podemos (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), 
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or populist parties with a more heterogeneous profile like the Five Star Movement in Italy. 
With Brussels-imposed austerity and bailouts the societies of the European South, that had until 
that point been quite pro-EU, came to see EU membership as a constraint on national 
sovereignty and democratic representation (Clements et al, 2014). 
The success of these populist movements cannot be understood in isolation from their 
capacity to lump together domestic and international elites (Brussels, the financial markets, 
Germany), to problematize the genuineness of democratic choice under conditions of intrusive 
macroeconomic monitoring, and to clamour for reinstatement of democratic sovereignty to the 
locus where this has been traditionally practiced, i.e. the nation-state. Even though populist 
mobilization during the Eurozone crisis has had transnational dimensions (such as when 
SYRIZA leader Alexis Tsipras ran as a candidate for president of the European Commission 
in the 2014 European elections), populist parties in the EU South represent political identities 
of the ‘people’ defined primarily along national lines (Halikiopoulou et al, 2012). 
A comparison between the populist and the non-populist left is instructive. The attitude of 
most variants of the non-populist left in Western democracies – social-democratic, green, even 
radical anti-globalization ones – towards internationalization had been to try to democratize 
global governance at the international level on the basis of cosmopolitan ideas. They would not 
challenge the fact of internationalization but rather its content. They accepted that problems of 
transnational nature demanded international solutions, and tried to shape the deliberations of 
global governance accordingly. The comparison with the populist left puts into perspective the 
distinct logic of populism: even parties espousing progressive goals may see these as best 
realized by territorially grounded communities (Zürn, 2004: 278-285; 2014: 61-64). 
A good example of this is the SYRIZA-led government in Greece that came to power in 
2015 on an explicit promise to reorient Greece's relationship with the EU. Many were surprised 
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that SYRIZA chose for its coalition partner not one of the ideologically adjacent (but pro-EU) 
centre-left parties but the nationalist-populist party of Independent Greeks (ANEL). That 
choice signalled SYRIZA’s understanding that the end of austerity was not just a matter of 
economic policy, but primarily of reinstatement of policy independence to the national level. 
The economic renegotiation with the Eurozone was the most prominent example of this 
approach. But the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition exhibited an intention to extract Greece from the 
obligations that the embedding in EU and other international structures entailed in a range of 
other policy areas as well: from energy policy (Michalopoulos, 2015) to immigration, where 
SYRIZA challenged the EU Dublin regulations not only on humanitarian grounds but also 
on  national interest grounds (claiming that they placed unfair burdens on Greece), to even 
sports governance, where its effort to uproot corruption from Greek football turned into a 
showdown with UEFA’s rules of political non-interference in football affairs. 
Until it was forced by the Eurozone to accept a new bailout in July 2015, the SYRIZA-
ANEL coalition explicitly presented disengagement from external constraints as precondition 
for putting through its domestic agenda. Indeed, most of SYRIZA’s ambitious promises, from 
the end of austerity to a shakeup of the ‘old system of economic oligarchy’ to a reinstatement 
of the ‘people’ as the ultimate source of political power, presupposed the modification of a 
series of international agreements and obligations Greece had signed up to. More than an anti-
austerity coalition, the Tsipras government of the first half of 2015 was a far-reaching 
experiment in radically re-territorializing political rule.  
Elsewhere in Europe, the governments of Viktor Orban in Hungary and of Law and Justice 
(PiS) in Poland challenge the EU based on nationalist populism. Here as well these 
governments go beyond simple policy spats with Brussels. They both put forward the 
repatriation of powers to nation-states from the EU and hence the re-alignment of state with 
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popular sovereignty. Autarky from international financial institutions plays a big role in 
Orban’s rhetoric (given Hungary's experience with IMF-dictated austerity and economic crisis 
that spilled over into widespread distrust of pro-European elites in 2008-10), while PiS has 
decided (not unlike the first SYRIZA-ANEL government) to vocally challenge EU diktats 
across the board, from immigration to environmental policy to reform of the judiciary. 
In both cases the ‘elites’ and ‘power’ which these governments are opposing are not only 
inside Hungary and Poland but also outside, primarily in Brussels. More than their rise to 
power, it is their exercise of power in office that relies on a constant targeting of institutions 
and processes outside the borders of the nation-state. More than overturning the ‘system’ at 
home, it is the rebalancing of the state’s relationship with the transgovernmental and 
supranational structures within which it is embedded that is meant to guarantee popular 
sovereignty. Mirroring the actions of populist governments, opposition movements in both 
countries have come to see EU membership as the last guarantee for the survival of counter-
majoritarian institutions of liberal democracy in their countries.  
The Leave campaign in the British EU membership referendum also exhibited frustration 
with elites’ embedding in policy processes that transcend the nation-state and limit the options 
of political communities. British Euroscepticism has a long pedigree of presenting the EU as 
an intrusive and unelected institution that limits the sovereignty of parliament and courts. Both 
the Leave campaign during the referendum, and the Conservative government of Theresa May 
that undertook to implement UK’s exit from the EU after the Brexit vote, advocated re-
establishing popular sovereignty and control over key functions of the state that were subsumed 
in EU policy networks and institutions, from trade policy to immigration to market regulation. 
It is interesting to note that, while British Euroscepticism and the vast majority of the Leave 
campaign were rooted in the right (the Conservative Party and the right-wing populist UKIP), 
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the same affinity for independent policymaking accountable to the people has also been 
exhibited by the left wing of the Labour Party, most prominently its leader Jeremy Corbyn, an 
exponent of left-wing populism in Europe – Labour’s central election slogan in the 2017 
election after all was ‘For the many, not the few’. Populists of the left and the right may differ 
as to how inclusive the political community inside national borders must be, but both think that 
policy discretion presupposes freedom from external constraints, and that popular sovereignty 
is ultimately realized within the jurisdiction of the state. Contrary to the preferences of Labour’s 
elites, Corbyn’s attitude towards the EU ranges from the indifferent to the outright suspicious 
although many of the policies he espouses – tighter market regulation, protection of the 
environment – would arguably be easier to achieve if the UK remained in the EU.  
This is not to indiscriminately equate the populist right with the populist left. Whether 
populism prioritizes a definition of the ‘people’ according to the inside/outside dimension that 
is a key feature of nationalism (as the populist right does) or an emancipatory ‘empty’ 
understanding of the populist signifier that draws on its core up/down dimension (as the 
populist left does) (De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017: 13-14) has indeed important repercussions 
about populist preferences on domestic governance. But under conditions of 
internationalization the inside/outside and top/down dimensions are increasingly difficult to 
disentangle. The increasingly hostile attitude of some left-wing Brexiteers towards 
immigration from Eastern Europe, originally a rallying call of right-wing populists, is a case in 
point here (see e.g. Goodhart, 2018). 
With state elites increasingly embedded in transnational governance networks and 
supranational institutions, an emancipatory vertical differentiation between the elites and the 
people inevitable acquires an inside/outside dimension. This has allowed the European populist 
left to deploy patriotic and sovereigntist themes next to its egalitarian ones during the Eurozone 
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crisis in ways that the non-populist left would find difficult to do. SYRIZA’s revival of World 
War II national resistance slogans is a case in point (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014).  
Under state internationalization on the other hand the inside/outside dimension that is 
characteristic of nationalism and, in a more radical form, nativism (Mudde, 2007) finds it easier 
to acquire a more emancipatory content. The menacing ‘outside’ is not only equal (hostile 
nations) or inferior (immigrants, minorities), but also superior (global and regional elites). This 
allows the populist right to infuse its nationalist understanding of the ‘people’ with an anti-elite 
meaning, making it appear emancipatory and democratizing. Ultimately, under state 
internationalization populism is an attractive political strategy because it allows an inter-
articulation of the up/down and inside/outside dimensions.    
 
Conclusions 
This article has argued that populism today is a reaction to state internationalization under 
conditions of globalization. This state transformation has been brought about as state elites 
tried to use adaptation to policy challenges of increasingly global and transnational character 
to legitimize their insulation from fragmenting and individualizing societies formulating 
increasingly complex demands. Populism can effectively express discontent with all of the 
economic dislocation, representational impotence and normative modernization that underpin 
this disaggregation of state sovereignty. For this reason, it is a rewarding strategy against state 
internationalization under conditions of globalization, and of state transformation more 
generally. 
A conceptualization of populism as an antagonistic discourse constructed around the 
signifier of the ‘people’ helps us appreciate its role in international relations both as a reaction 
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to material structural change and as a counter-normative discourse opposing the universality of 
dominant international norms that legitimize the unbundling of the nation-state. This discursive 
conceptualization of populism dovetails with the ideational view of world politics that is found 
in constructivist and post-structural literatures of international relations theory. It is therefore 
one way for future research to bridge political theory, comparative politics and IR in the study 
of populism in world politics. 
Another conceptual corollary is that, in an ever-globalized world, it is necessary to 
incorporate the international dimension as constitutive of a definition of populism and its 
differentiation from non-populist politics. Greece is an interesting example. Even after 
accepting a new bailout, the SYRIZA-ANEL government was re-elected in September 2015 
and is since then implementing EU-dictated austerity. Is it still populist though? According to 
the argument here, a key feature of populism is the active effort to undo at least some of the 
key features of state internationalization. Under this definition, the SYRIZA-ANEL 
government, which after the summer of 2015 tries to tackle all major policy challenges Greece 
faces (the economy, migration, foreign policy) via the EU, can only with great difficulty still 
be considered populist. 
With regards to the historical applicability of the analysis, this article argues that populism 
need not be identified with any specific policy or ideological outlook. If populism in Western 
democracies today usually exhibits an opposition to free trade, global governance, 
humanitarian intervention and policies that imply further denationalization and disaggregation 
of state sovereignty, it is important to remember that e.g. the American agrarian populists of 
the 1890s were pro-free trade and in favour of supporting democratic governments around the 
world (Amstutz, 2014) or that the populist radical right in the 1980s had embraced neoliberal 
economics (Chryssogelos, 2014). In all these cases the distinct characteristic of populism was 
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not its policy content, but the form under which this was being articulated: a weaving of various 
grievances around the moral claim to representation of a constructed identity of the ‘people’ 
with the promise to normatively counter whatever was considered at any given time the modern 
and appropriate exercise of statehood. Historical comparisons may shed further light on 
populism’s role as opponent to previous cases of state transformation. 
With regards to the applicability outside of the West of the claim that populism is a reaction 
to state internationalization, this indeed seems to be the case to the extent that in multiple world 
regions populism emerged after experiments of sheltering the state from the socioeconomic 
demands and representational expectations of political communities by subsuming its functions 
in international and supranational institutions (Bickerton, 2012: 190-191). State transformation 
in Europe towards the ‘member state’ for example may have its analogy in Asia in the 
emergence of the depoliticized and representationally insulated ‘regulatory state’ (Bickerton, 
2015: 57) which is also deeply enmeshed in regional and global governance institutions. Asian 
populisms could then fruitfully be understood also through the lens of state internationalization, 
especially in countries like Thailand where at times of financial crisis international institutions 
enabled the responses of a state always suspicious of the popular masses (McCargo, 2001).  
Similar patterns were present in Latin America, with the emergence of left-wing populism 
in several countries after the economic crises of the 1990s, and in Turkey, with the emergence 
of Islamic populism after a harsh IMF adjustment program (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). In these 
cases as well, traditional elites’ embrace of internationalization, accentuated in periods of crisis, 
lead to populist reactions that saw making the state responsive to popular demands and freeing 
it from international constraints as mutually dependent goals.  
Finally, the degree of state internationalization may explain the different content of 
populist identities in world politics. In the West, where the state is deeply embedded in 
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networks of transgovernmental governance, populism wants to curtail state internationalization 
that has gone too far, hence the discursive constructions of the ‘people’ overlap often to a large 
degree with national identities. In the Global South internationalization of the state is resisted, 
but often the deficient representation of the state itself in the international system is also seen 
as a problem. Hence a demand of non-Western populisms is often not the withdrawal from 
structures of international cooperation, as often posited by their Western brethren, but their 
radical democratization. For this reason, populist discourses in the Global South may be both 
territorially grounded when they demand the de-internationalization of the state, and ‘pan-
national’ (De Cleen, 2017) when they construct identities of the ‘people’ on regional (Latin 
America), religious (Islam) and other transnational bases to counter global governance norms 
and institutions largely developed by the West. The hypothesis then is that the deeper the 
absorption of the state in structures of transgovernmental cooperation and supranational 
institutions, the more territorial and nation-centred the construction of the ‘people’.  
In conclusion, populism can be understood as a distinct discourse of international relations 
that emerges as reaction to state transformation due to its capacity a) to articulate resistance to 
resulting material, political and ideational dislocations as a moral representational claim of the 
‘people’; and b) to act as a normative counterweight to the universality of established 
international norms that underpin the functioning of the international system and ideas of 
appropriate practice of statehood. The exact articulation of the identity of the ‘people’ and the 
policy content may differ between populisms, but they will all be united in presenting state 
transformation and adaptation to international change as exacerbating gaps between official 
power and territorially defined political community. With regards to state internationalization 
under globalization, populist agendas posit the alternative vision of neo-sovereign rule, which 
differs in crucial respects from classical ideas of national sovereignty.  
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